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Abstract 
 
We address the problem of load balancing which is considered as a technique to spread 
work between two or more computers in order to get optimal response time  and resource 
utilization between servers by using Nash equilibrium which is the central concern of game 
theory. We use a normal form table to express the payoff for every client, every client has 
estimate time for execution and every server has speed, from these facts, we innovate a 
dynamic payoff matrix to evaluate a Nash equilibrium point and then determine which 
server can serve an appropriate client to achieve best load balancing which is called 
"server matching" (Each client is matched to exactly one server, but a server can be 
matched to multiple clients or none.). We use Netlogo simulation to implement this 
matching, besides a useful game theory toolset called GAMBIT (Gambit toolset 
homepage, 2005) to solve the payoff matrix and compute Nash equilibrium point. 
 
This paper was done between the years 2007 – 2009, and to know what was done in this 
paper we can argue that we contribute in accomplishing the load balancing between 
servers, using new technique depends on game theory perspective, for that reason we can 
answer the question why this thesis was done, because it is very vital in achieving this goal. 
 
We use in our thesis a simulation methodology to prove the results that we have obtained 
from the simulation program which is a Netlogo V4.0.2, and we compare the results with 
traditionally techniques in load balancing. 
 
Finally, the results show that we improve the performance for the whole system by 4% in 
achieving load balancing and overweight the possibilities of using this technique in real 
system around the world. 
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  Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Over many years, load balancing, is a problem that inspired the researcher. In this thesis, 
we try to have a new approach using game theory perspective. 
This thesis was affected by the continued growth of internet applications, and in the 
absence of central authority that can control this growth, so users have choice to choose its 
own server to download their data, that each user wants to minimize its own latency, 
without concerning the optimal welfare for the whole system, this selfish behavior could 
lead us to bottleneck in the system. 
Game theory is generally considered to have begun with the publication of von Neumann 
& Morgenstern’s, "The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior", in 1944, it introduced 
the idea that conflict could be mathematically analyzed that have a methodology and 
provided the terminology with which to do it. The development of the ―Prisoner’s 
Dilemma‖ and Nash’s papers on the definition and existence of equilibrium laid the 
foundations for modern noncooperative game theory. At the same time, cooperative game 
theory reached important on bargaining games and on the core. (Rasmusen, 2005) 
We propose to use the game theory perspective in order to achieve  load between several 
servers which is called "load balancing" which aims to spread work between two or more 
computers, in order to get optimal resource utilization, or response time. 
In our thesis, we concentrate on load balancing criteria with response time for every client; 
every client that achieves minimum time on serving his request on any server will require 
underpinning for our approach in achieving load balancing between servers. 
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1.1 Motivation for this thesis 
Game theory is considered as an interrelated area of researcher in which it involves 
computer science, also it is interrelated to many useful aspects as political, marketing, 
auctions, and  any other subject that have to do a decision making. 
As the user’s population accessing internet services grow in size and dispersion, it is 
necessary to improve performance and scalability by deploying multiple, distributed server 
sites. Distributing services has the benefit of reducing access latencies, and improving 
service scalability by distributing the load among several sites. One important issue in such 
a scenario is how the user chooses the appropriate server. 
Similar problem occurs in the context of routing where the user has to select one of a few 
parallel links. For instance, many enterprise networks are connected to multiple internet 
service providers (ISPs) for redundant connectivity, and backbones often have multiple 
parallel trunks. Users are likely to behave "selfishly" in such cases that is each user makes 
decisions so as to optimize its own performance, without coordination with the other users.  
Basically, each user would like to either maximize the resources allocated to it or, 
alternatively, minimize its cost. Load balancing and other resource allocation problems are 
prime candidates for such a "selfish" behavior. 
A natural framework to analyze this class of problems is that of non-cooperative games, 
and an appropriate solution concept is that of Nash equilibrium. Users' strategy at Nash 
equilibrium if no user can access by unilaterally deviating from its own policy. An 
interesting class of non-cooperative games, which is related to load balancing, is 
congestion games and its equivalent model of potential games. In a potential game there is 
a potential function which maps the current state to a real number (in the load balancing 
scenario a state would include assignment of jobs to machines).  
They consider (Kothari, 2005) deviations of a single player (job) and compare the change 
in the deviating player's utility (load) to the change in the potential function. In an exact 
potential game the changes are identical. In a weighted potential game the changes are 
related by a factor that depends only on the player. In an ordinal potential game the 
changes are in the same direction, while in a generalized potential game an increase in a 
player's utility implies an increase in the potential function (but not vice versa). 
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In this thesis, we develop a new approach that depends on the normal form table which is 
different from the model in (Kothari, 2005) which focuses on calculating the price of 
anarchy. 
Secondly, we build our model depending on MultiAgent system that operates on local 
knowledge and possessing limited abilities to achieve a desirable result which is similar to 
model (Kothari, 2005). 
Finally, we also use a state-of-the-art game theory tool from University of Minnesota 
called GAMBIT (Gambit toolset homepage, 2005), it is open source software, which allow 
us to calculate the Nash equilibrium on any normal from table. 
1.2 Game theory as a predictive theory 
Game theory can be a good theory of human behavior for two distinct reasons. First, it may 
be the case that game theory is a good theory of rationality, that agents are rational and that 
therefore game theory predicts their behavior well. If game theory was correct for this 
reason, it could reap the additional benefit of great stability. Many social theories are 
inherently unstable, because agents adjust their behavior in the light of its predictions. If 
game theory is a good predictive theory because it is a good theory of rationality, this will 
be because each player expects every other player to follow the theory’s prescriptions and 
have no incentive to deviate from the recommended course of action. Thus, game theory 
would already take into account that players’ knowledge of the theory has a causal effect 
on the actions it predicts.  
Second, and independently of the question of whether game theory is a good theory of 
rationality, game theory may be a good theory because it offers the relevant tools to 
systematize and predict interactive behavior successfully. This distinction may make sense 
when separating our intuitions about how agents behave rationally from a systematic 
account of our observations of how agents behave.  
We begin with some game theory background information in chapter 2, for readers who 
might not familiar with game theory. Chapter 3 describes our server matching model in 
achieving load balancing, chapter 4 explains the details implementation, chapter 5 
conclusions and future work.  
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1.3 Objectives 
Our goal in this thesis is to find an optimal strategy to achieve load balancing using game 
theory with dynamic clients, one of the ways proposed by (Kothari, 2005), they introduce 
this but with static number of clients, and each of clients chooses a server from a 
permissible set. A server's latency is inversely proportional to its speed, but it grows 
linearly with the number of clients matched to it. In our model, we use Netlogo simulation 
to propose a new model with dynamic clients, that our server matching game is a form of 
the congestion games, that every congestion game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. A 
strategy in our server matching game is the choice of the servers. We focus on the atomic 
version of the game, where each client chooses exactly one server. 
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Chapter 2 
Background 
 
2.1 History of game theory 
One pedestal of game theory is the concept of mixed strategy based on the concept of 
probability which is therefore essential to reach some interesting results. The beginning of 
probability calculus is associated with the correspondence of Pierre de Fermat and Blaise 
Pascal dated in 1654. Hence the true prehistory can start only after this event that happened 
just 353 years ago and represent the first key milestone in the history of game theory. 
(Hyksova, 2004) 
2.2 Waldegrave with Mixed strategy 
James Waldegrave gave the first known mixed strategy solution of a matrix game. It was 
related to the game, he was looking for a strategy that maximizes the probability of player's 
win, whichever strategy was chosen by the opponent, that is, exactly in the sense of today 
minmax principle. He came to the following mixed strategy solution formulated in terms of 
black and white chips: Tony should choose the strategy‖ change 7 and lower‖ with the 
probability 5/8 and the strategy― hold 7 and higher‖ with the probability 3/8; Hanna should 
choose the strategy‖ change 8 and lower‖ with the probability 3/8 and the strategy‖ hold 8 
and higher‖ with the probability 5/8. (Hyksova, 2004) 
 2.3 Game theory and Mathematics 
In the period 1921 – 1928 the concept of mathematics in game theory was existed 
(Hyksova, 2004), Emile Borel published a series of notes on symmetric two players zero 
sum games with a finite number n of pure strategy of each player. Borel was the first who 
attempted to mathematic the game of strategy, he introduced the concept of method of play 
in the sense of today pure strategy and he was looking for a solution in mixed strategy in 
the sense of today minmax solution.   
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The next important milestone is represented by the publication "Theory of games and 
Economic behavior" in 1944 (Hyksova, 2004), which was the result of a fruitful 
collaboration of Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. This event is usually considered as 
the beginning of the existence of game theory as a fully fledged mathematical discipline. 
Neumann and Morgenstern started with a detailed formulation of economical problem 
showed the exceptionally broad application possibilities of game theory in economy; then 
they settled the foundations of an axiomatic utility theory. 
In 1954 Lloyd Shapley published a paper which represents one of the earliest explicit 
applications of game theory to political sciences. They used the Shapley value, one of the 
solution concepts for cooperative games introduced by Shapley one year earlier to 
determine the power of the members of the United Nations Security Council. 
2.4 Entrance of Game theory into evolutionary Biology 
Nowadays game theory is the main tool for the investigation of conflict and cooperation of 
animals and plants. As for zoological applications, the game theory is used for the analysis, 
modeling and understanding the fight, cooperation and communication of animals, 
coexistence of alternative traits, mating systems, conflict between the sexes, offspring sex 
ratio, distribution of individuals in their habitats, etc. Among botanical applications we can 
find the questions of seed dispersal, seed germination, root competition, nectar production, 
flower size, sex allocation, etc. (Hyksova, 2004) 
In 1960’s several isolated works using a game-theoretical approach in biology appeared. A 
historical milestone is represented by the short but ‖epoch-making‖ paper The Logic of 
Animal Conflict by J. Maynard Smith and G. R. Price. This treatise, published in 1973, 
stimulated a great deal of successful works and applications of game theory in evolutionary 
biology; the development of the following decade was summarized in Maynard Smith’s 
book Evolution and the Theory of Games Not only proved game theory to provide the 
most satisfying explanation of the theory of evolution and the principles of behavior of 
animals and plants in mutual interactions, it was just this field which turned out to provide 
the most promising applications of the theory of games at all. Is this a paradox? How is it 
possible that the behavior of animals or plants prescribed on the base of game-theoretical 
models agree with the action observed in the nature? Can a fly or a fig tree, for example, be 
a rational decision-maker who evaluates all possible outcomes and by the tools of game 
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theory selects his optimal strategy? How is it possible that even the less developed the 
thinking ability of an organism is, the better game theory tends to work? The explanation is 
simple: the players of the game are not taken to be the organisms under study, but the 
genes in which the instinctive behavior of these organisms is coded.  
The strategy is then the behavioral phenotype, i.e. the behavior preprogrammed by the 
genes – the specification of what an individual will do in any situation in which it may find 
itself; the payoff function is a reproductive fitness, i.e. the measure of the ability of a gene 
to survive and spread in the genotype of the population in question. The main solution 
concept of this model is the evolutionary stable strategy which is defined as a strategy such 
that, if all the members of a population adopt it, no mutant strategy can invade. In certain 
specific situations, this somewhat vague concept is expressed more precisely. (Hyksova, 
2004) 
2.5 Normal form and extensive form 
In game theory there are two ways to represent a game. The first one is called normal form 
(Martin J. Osborne, 1994), which is used in simple games and economics, the second one 
is called the extensive form, which also used widely in economics. 
We can define the three parts that every game must have: 
1. The players: the players in a game are actual participants who make relevant 
decisions that jointly determine the outcome of a game. 
2. The strategy: every player have a complete description of how a player could play a 
game, the strategy is comprised of all a player's possible alternative strategies. 
3. The Payoffs: A payoff is what the player will get at the end of the game conditions 
on the actions of all other opponents in the game (the opponents here do not 
suggest players are necessarily trying to beat each other, rather they are making 
decisions to maximize their own utility. Since the game may be zero-sum or non-
zero-sum, these independent decisions may lead to conflict or coalition). (Romp, 
1997) 
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2.6 Normal form game 
A strategic form game (Martin J. Osborne, 1994) shows the payoffs of all combinations of 
different players' strategies in a matrix. Players are said to be rational when they seek to 
maximize their payoff. In game theory we are interested in rational players. 
Table 2.1 illustrates the strategic form of a classic two-player game called the prisoner's 
Dilemma. This game is often used to explain basic game theory concept. The motivation 
story is that two suspects have been arrested by police and are being held in two different 
cells. Each suspect has a choice of confess (C) or deny (D). They don't know each other's 
decision when they have to make their own decision. The entries in the matrix are two 
numbers representing the utility or payoff suspect 1 and suspect 2 respectively. Note that 
higher numbers are better (more utility). If either of them deny, both of them will be 
convicted of a minor crime and put in jail for one month (each of them receive a utility of -
2, which represented as (-2,-2) in table 2.1. (Rasmusen, 2005) 
Normal game of Prisoner Dilemma 
Table 2.1: Normal form table for Prisoner Dilemma1 
  Player 2 
  C D 
Player 1 
C -8,-8 0,-10 
D -10,0 -2,-2 
 
If both of them confess, they will both convicted and sentenced to six month in jail (each 
of them get a utility of -8, which is represented as (-8,-8) in Table 2.1. If one of them 
confesses, but the other one doesn't, then the one who confesses will be released 
immediately and will get a utility of 0, while the other will be sentenced to nine months in 
jail and will get a utility of -10. This corresponds to the other two cells in Table 2.1. For 
example if player 1 confesses, but player 2 deny, then player 1 will get a utility of 0 and 
player 2 will get a utility of -10. (Rasmusen, 2005) 
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In this example, player 1 and player 2 are the two players. They have identical strategy (C, 
D), which means each has two different choices of actions. The payoffs are the number in 
the table. The first number in a cell represents player 1's payoff, the second number 
represents the player 2's payoff. For example if both players confess, the top-left table item 
tells us both players will get a payoff of -8. (Romp, 1997) 
2.7 Extensive form game 
Normal form games (Vidal, 2007) do not provide a simple way to analyze the dynamics of 
strategic interactions, since all players simultaneously make their decisions. Extensive 
form game (Rasmusen, 2005) provides more information about how the timing actions 
may affect outcomes. This type of game is represented as a game tree instead of matrix. 
The four parts that combine the Extensive form (Martin J. Osborne, 1994): 
1. Nodes: This is a position in the game tree where a player must have to make a 
decision. Each node is labeled with a number so as to identify who is making the 
decision. 
2. Branches: These branches of the game tree represent different alternative choices 
available to a player. 
3. Payoff vector: These represents the payoffs for each player, the payoffs are listed in 
the order of players at the leaves of the tree. 
4. Information set: An information set is a collection of decision nodes for a single 
player, but which are indistinguishable for the player who is making the decision. 
Since any two nodes in the same information set are indistinguishable, they must 
have exactly the same number of branches. 
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2 
Confess 
Deny 
Confess 
Deny 
Confess 
Deny 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 2.1:  Extensive form of Prisoner's Dilemma (Martin J. Osborne, 1994) 
 
Each circle represents a node in the game tree (Romp, 1997); the label on the node 
represents which player is going to make decision. The branches coming out of a node 
represent the actions available to the player at that point in the game. Player 1 can either 
confess or deny. At the end of these two branches there is a node representing player 2's 
decision. Player 2 also has two choices: Confess or deny, these are represented by the 
branches stemming out of player 2's node. In this case, player 2 has to make his decision 
without knowing player 1's action. This means when player 2 needs to make his decisions, 
he only knows he is at one node in this information set, but he is not sure which node he is 
at. Finally, at the end of each branch, is the payoff vector, with the payoffs of each player 
listed in order. For example, the top payoff vector is (-8,-8). This means if player 1 and 
player 2 both decide to confess, the payoff of player 1 is -8, the payoff of player2 is -8. 
1 
(-10,0) 
2 
(-8,-8) 
(0,-10) 
(-2,-2) 
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2.8 Pure strategy 
A pure strategy (Martin J. Osborne, 1994) in game theory is a policy that states the player's 
decision at any decision node in game tree. 
2.9 Mixed strategy 
A mixed strategy (Rasmusen, 2005) allows the player to select from a set of actions 
randomly selecting one of choices. The choices are weighted by pre assigned probabilities. 
It is a fundamental concept in game theory, whereas, in certain situations your best strategy 
is to behave unpredictably. In fact, a pure strategy is just a special case of mixed strategy 
with only one action in the decision set. A mixed strategy is beneficial when given your 
opponent's action. 
In mixed strategy of players 1 and 2 are the vectors of probabilities p, q for which the 
following conditions hold: 
 P=(p1,p2,…pm);   pi ≥0,  p1 + p2 +….+pm =1,     (2.1) 
 Q=(q1,q2,…qn);   qi ≥0,  q1 + q2 +….+qn =1.     (2.2) 
So a mixed strategy is therefore again a certain strategy that can be characterized the 
following way: 
"Use the strategy s1    S with the probability p1,  
..., 
Use the strategy sm     S with the probability pm." 
Definition 1: the expected payoffs are defined by the relations: 
 Player 1 ∏1(p,q)=∑ ∑ piqjaij      (2.3) 
 Player 2: ∏2(p,q)=∑ ∑ piqjbij      (2.4) 
A mixed strategy s
*
 =(p1,..pm) is the best reply to t
*
 if and only if each of pure strategies 
that occur in s
*
 with positive probabilities is the best reply to t
*
. (Morris, 1994) 
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Example: Consider the following payoff: 
Table 2.2: Normal form table (Morris, 1994)2 
  Player 2 
 Strategy T1 T2 
Player 1 
S1 (4,-4) (-1,-1) 
S2 (0,1) (1,0) 
 
Expected values for particular players are the following: 
   ∏1(p,q) = 4pq-p(1-q) + 0 + (1-p)(1-q) 
       = p (6q-2) –q + 1 
   ∏2(p,q) = -4pq-p(1-q) + (1-p)q + 0 
       = q (-4p +1) –p 
Now we will search best replies of the player of the player 1 to various choices of 
probabilities q: 
If 0 ≤ q < ⅓, then for a fixed value of q, ∏1(p,q) is a linear function with the negative 
slope, which is therefore decreasing. Maximum of this function occurs for the least 
possible value of p. i.e. for p=0; in this case it is: R1 (q) =0. 
If q=⅓, then ∏1(p,⅓)=⅔ is a constant function for which each value is maximal and 
minimal – player 1 is therefore indifferent between both strategies, R1(⅓) =(0,1). 
If ⅓ < q ≤ 1, then for a fixed value of q, ∏1(p,q) is a liner function with the positive slope, 
which is therefore increasing. Maximum occurs for the greatest possible value of p, i.e. for 
p=1; in this case it is R1 (q) =1. 
On the whole 
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 R1 (q) = 












1
3
1
1
3
1
)1,0(
3
1
00
qfor
qfor
qfor
 
Similarly for player 2: 
 R2(p) = 












1
4
1
0
4
1
)1,0(
4
1
01
pfor
pfor
pfor
 
Equilibrium point is therefore ))
3
2
,
3
1
(),
4
3
,
4
1
((  
Provided the players follow these strategies, the expected payoff to the first player will be 
⅔ and to second one -1/4. (Morris, 1994) 
2.10 Elimination of dominated strategies 
In some cases it is possible to eliminate obviously bad, so called dominated strategies: 
Definition 2: The strategy sl    S of the player 1 is called dominating another strategy si   S 
if, for each strategy t   T of the player 2 we have: 
   U1 (sl, t) ≥ u1 (si, t)      (2.7) 
If there remains the only element in the bimatrix after an iterated elimination of dominated 
strategies, it is the desired equilibrium point. If there remain more elements, we have at 
least a simpler bimatrix. 
 We see the following example: 
  
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
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Table 2.3: Table before elimination of dominated element3 
 
 
 
 
 
Example: Consider the following payoff 
The strategy s2 of the first player is dominated by the strategy s3, because he receives more 
when he chooses s3 than when he chooses s2, whatever strategy is chosen by the second 
player. Similarly the strategy t3 of the second player is dominated by the strategy t2. Since 
the rational player 1 will not choose the dominated strategy s2 and the rational player 2 will 
not choose the dominated strategy t3, the decision is reduced in this way: 
 
The reduced Table 
Table 2.4: The reduce table after elimination of dominated element4 
  Player 2 
 Strategy T1 T2 
Player 1 
S1 (1,0) (1,3) 
S3 (0,2) (2,4) 
  
Strategy t1 dominated by the strategy t2, the second player therefore chooses t2. The first 
player now decides between the values in the second column of the bimatrix, and since 1 < 
2, he chooses s3. Hence an equilibrium point of the game is (s3, t2) think over the fact that 
in the original matrix, one sided deviation from the equilibrium strategy does not bring an 
improvement to the "deviant". 
  Player 2 
 Strategy T1 T2 T3 
Player 1 
S1 (1,0) (1,3) (3,0) 
S2 (0,2) (0,1) (3,0) 
S3 (0,2) (2,4) (5,3) 
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2.11 Games with complete and incomplete information 
Perfect information (Haurie, 2000): at each move in the game, the player with the move 
knows the full history of the play of the game. 
Imperfect information (Haurie, 2000): at some move the player with move does not know 
the history of the game. 
2.12 Nash equilibrium 
In games, a pair of strategies (a
*
, b
*
) is defined to be a Nash equilibrium (Rasmusen, 2005) 
if a
*
 is player A's best strategy when player B plays b
*
, and b
*
 is player B's best strategy 
when player A plays a
*
. For example, in a two person strategic interaction, a Nash 
equilibrium combination of strategic is such that each agent's best reply to the other agent's 
best reply to it. We will say that each strategy in the combination is a Nash equilibrium 
component strategy. Solving a game is just the process of finding the Nash equilibrium of 
this game. 
2.12.1 Shortcomings of the Nash equilibrium concept  (Multiple equlibria)  
It is possible that a bimatrix game (Haurie, 2000) can have several equilibria in pure 
strategies. There may be also additional equilibria in mixed strategies as well. The multiple 
values of Nash equilibria for bimatrix games are a serious theoretical and practical 
problem.   
The following table shows the two equilibria in pure strategies. 
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Table 2.5: This bimatrix game has two equilibria5 
  Player 2 
 
 A B 
Player 1 
A 2  2 0  0 
B 0  0 2  2 
 
It is difficult to decide how this game should be played if player 1 choose (A,A) and 
player2 choose (B,B) independently of  one another. Each player has two pure strategies A 
and B.  The numbers in the table denote the utility of player 1 and player 2 respectively. 
There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria at (A,A) and (B,B).  There is also one mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium where both player randomize with a 1/2 chance of A and a 1/2 
chance of B. 
What would we expect to happen in this game?  Both players prefer either of the two pure 
strategy Nash equilibria to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, since the expected utility 
to each player at the pure equilibrium is 2, while the expected utility at the mixed 
equilibrium is only 1.  But in the absence of any coordinating device, it is not obvious how 
the two players can guess which equilibrium to go to. This might suggest that they will 
play the mixed equilibrium. But at the mixed equilibrium, each player is indifferent, so 
while equilibrium requires that they give each strategy exactly the same probability, there 
is no strong reason for them to do so.  Moreover, if player 1, say, believes that player 2 is 
even slightly more likely to play A than B, then player 1 will want to play A with 
probability one.  From an intuitive point of view, the stability of this mixed strategy 
equilibrium seems questionable. 
In contrast, it seems easier for play to remain at one of the pure equilibria, because here 
each player strictly prefers to play his part of the Nash equilibrium profile as long as he 
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believes there is a high probability that his opponent is playing according to that 
equilibrium.   Intuitively, this type of equilibrium seems more robust.   
This coordination game example, although simple, illustrates the two main questions   that 
the theory of learning in games has tried to address, namely: When and why should we 
expect play to correspond to Nash equilibrium?  And, if there are several Nash equilibria, 
which ones should we expect to occur? 
Moreover, these questions are closely linked: Absent an explanation of how the players 
coordinate their expectations on the same Nash equilibrium, we are faced with the 
possibility that player 1 expects the equilibrium (A,A) and so plays A, while player 2 
expects (B,B) and plays B, with the result the non-equilibrium outcome (A.B).  Briefly, the 
idea of learning-based explanations of equilibrium is that the fact that the players share a 
common history of observations can provide a way for them to coordinate their 
expectations on one of the two pure-strategy equilibria.  Typical learning models predict 
that this coordination will eventually occur, with the determination of which of the two 
equilibria arise left either to (unexplained) initial conditions or to random chance. 
However, for the history to serve this coordinating role, the sequence of actions played 
must eventually become constant or at least readily predictable by the players, and there is 
no presumption that this is always the case.  Perhaps rather than going to Nash equilibrium, 
the result of learning is that the strategies played, wander around aimlessly, or perhaps play 
lies in some set of alternative larger than the set of Nash equilibria. 
2.12.2 Algorithms for the Computation of Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix 
Games 
Linear programming (Haurie, 2000) is closely associated with the characterization and 
computation of saddle points in matrix games. For bimatrix games, one has to rely on 
algorithms solving either quadratic programming or complementarily problems. There are 
also a few algorithms which permit us to find equilibrium of simple bimatrix games. 
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2.13 Shapley Value  
The Shapley value (Gul, 1989)represents each player’s bargaining power in terms of a 
percentage of the total value created. Bargaining power varies with value contributed. 
Persons who contribute more receive a higher percentage of the benefits. 
Unlike non-cooperative game theory, cooperative game theory does not specify through 
the game a minute description of the strategic environment, including where to move, and 
a set of procedures in each step, and the consequences of return to play for rather than what 
might be detrimental to this set of data to the coalitional form. Cooperation should be a 
game theorist accurately forecast the reward of all the opportunities available to the 
alliance, which moved one of the real number: gone are the actions and movements of 
individual payoffs. Prime advantage of this approach, at least in the multiple player 
environments, is the practical usefulness. A real-life situation more easily fit in the form of 
a coalitional game, in which the structure is more than that of non-cooperative game, 
whether in the form of a normal or large-scale. 
 Before the advent of the Shapley value, one solution to the concept of cooperative game 
theory: the von Neumann Morgenstern solution (Gul, 1989). The core would not be 
defined until around the same time as the Shapley value. As set-valued solutions 
suggesting ―reasonable‖ allocations of the resources of the grand coalition, both the von 
Neumann–Morgenstern solution and the core are based on the coalitional form game. 
However, no single-point solution concept existed as of yet to associate a single payoff 
vector to a coalitional form game. In fact, in the form of coalitional game these days, even 
in a little black box of information on the establishment of one point and it seems that the 
solution can not be defended by. It was in spite of these sharp limitations that Shapley 
came up with the solution. Obviously, the use of an approach based Shapley not only a 
great solution for the definition of an attractive and intuitive, but also for the unique 
characteristics of a set of reasonable axioms. 
2.14 Using computer algebra to find Nash equilibrium 
A central concern of game theory is the computing of Nash equilibrium. These are 
characterized by systems of polynomial equations and inequalities.  
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Game theory has been used to model conflict and cooperation between rational agents. So 
game theory is a mathematical model of this interaction.  
The main computer package for studying game theory today is Gambit which is, developed 
by McKelvey, McLennan, and Turocy, is currently the standard software package for 
computing Nash equilibrium. Most of the code focuses on solving two person games 
because the two persons’ situation is already quite rich and interesting. Furthermore, the 
last version of this package gives precise solutions for more than two person games. (Datta, 
2003) 
2.14.1 GAMBIT 
GAMBIT (Gambit toolset homepage, 2005) is a library of game theory software toolsets 
for the construction and analysis of finite extensive and normal form games. Its core 
functionality was from 1994 to 1996. The project was supported by a NSF award to 
Caltech and the University of Minnesota. This software has been updated several times 
since. The latest version Gambit 0.2007.01.30 was released on January 30, 2007. Gambit is 
designed to work on both Microsoft windows (95/98/NT/XP) and UNIX (Linux, Solaris 
and others) platforms. 
Gambit is comprised of 3 parts: 
1- A GUI interface that can be used to construct and solve a normal form or extensive 
form game. 
2- A Gambit command line language, this is a script language, somewhat like Lisp. It 
has a set of built-in functions that can be used to write small programs to construct 
and analyze games. 
3- A library of C++ source code for representing games. This library can be 
incorporated in other applications to facilitate the analysis of games. 
2.15 Game theory and Computer science 
The influence of computer science in game theory has perhaps been most strongly felt 
through complexity theory. They consider a game-theoretic problem that originated in the 
computer science literature, but should be of interest to the game theory community: 
20 
 
2.15.1 The Price of Anarchy 
In a computer system, there are situations where they may have a choice between invoking 
a centralized solution to a problem or a decentralized solution. By ―centralized‖ here, they 
mean that each agent in the system is told exactly what to do and must do so; in the 
decentralized solution, each agent tries to optimize his own selfish interests. Of course, 
centralization comes at a cost. For one thing, there is a problem of enforcement. For 
another, centralized solutions tend to be more vulnerable to failure. On the other hand, a 
centralized solution may be more socially beneficial. How much more beneficial can it be? 
(Papadimitriou E. K., 1999) They formalized this question by comparing the ratio of the 
social welfare of the centralized solution to that of the social welfare of the Nash 
equilibrium with the worst social welfare (assuming that the social welfare function is 
always positive). They called this ratio the price of anarchy (Halpern, 2007), and proved a 
number of results regarding the price of anarchy for a scheduling problem on parallel 
machines. Since the original paper, the price of anarchy has been studied in many settings, 
including traffic routing, facility location games (e.g., where is the best place to put a 
factory), and spectrum sharing (how should channels in a Wi-Fi network be assigned). 
2.15.2 Game Theory and Distributed Computing 
Distributed computing and game theory are attentive in much the same problems: this 
system that many agents have different aims with uncertainty environment. In practice, 
however, there has been a significant difference in emphasis in the two areas. In distributed 
computing, the focus has been on problems such as fault tolerance, asynchrony, scalability, 
and proving correctness of algorithms; in game theory, the focus has been on strategic 
concerns. (Halpern, 2007) 
2.15.3 Implementing Mediators 
The question of whether there is a problem in MultiAgent system that can not be resolved 
with a trusted mediator can be solved only through agents in the system, without the 
mediator, has attracted a great deal of attention in both computer science (particularly in 
the cryptography community) and game theory. In cryptography, the focus on the problem 
has been on secure multiparty computation. (Halpern, 2007) 
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2.15.4 Interactive epistemology: 
There has been a great deal of activity in trying to understand the role of knowledge in 
games, and providing epistemic analyses of solution concepts in computer science, there 
has been a parallel literature applying epistemic logic to reason about distributed 
computation. One focus of this work has been on characterizing the level of knowledge 
needed to solve certain problems. For example, to achieve Byzantine agreement common 
knowledge among the no faulty agents of an initial value is necessary and sufficient. More 
generally, in a precise sense, common knowledge is necessary and sufficient for 
coordination. Another focus has been on defining logics that capture the reasoning of 
resource-bounded agents. This work has ranged from logics for reasoning about awareness, 
a topic that has been explored in both computer science and game theory. (Halpern, 2007) 
2.15.5 Network growth: 
If we view networks as being built by selfish players (who decide whether or not to build 
links), what will the resulting network look like? How does the growth of the network 
affect its functionality? For example, how easily will influence spread through the 
network? How easy is it to route traffic? (Halpern, 2007) 
2.15.6 Learning in games: 
There has been a great deal of work in both computer science and game theory on learning 
to play well in different settings for an overview of the work in game theory). One line of 
research in computer science involves learning to play optimally in a reinforcement 
learning setting, where an agent interacts with an unknown (but fixed) environment. The 
agent then faces a fundamental tradeoff between exploration and exploitation. The 
question is how long it takes to learn to play well (i.e., to get a reward within some fixed e 
of optimal; for the current state of the art. A related question is efficiently finding a 
strategy minimizes regret— that is, finding a strategy that is guaranteed to do not much 
worse than the best strategy would have done in hindsight (that, even knows what the 
opponent would have done). (Halpern, 2007) 
22 
 
2.16 Related Work 
Game theory provides a good starting point for computer scientists in their endeavor to 
understand selfish rational behavior in complex networks with many agents (clients). Such 
scenario are readily modeled using techniques from game theory, where players with 
potentially conflicting goals participate in a common setting with well prescribe 
interaction. 
A.Kothari, S. Suri, And Y. Zhou in paper (Kothari, 2005) has focusing there work on 
balancing the load across servers, but they assume that there are static clients set. They 
considered a set U on n client and a set V of m servers, there is a bipartite graph G between 
U and  and a server vj is permissible for client ui only if (ui, vj) is an edge in G. 
This problem for assigning clients (jobs) to servers (machines) back to the early days of 
computing or distributed scheduling, and there is an enormous literature on it. A small 
sample of these results includes the following (Westbrook, 1998), and (Shmoys, 
1995)investigate the online assignment of unit length jobs which is measured according to 
maximum number of jobs assigns to any server. (Alon, 1997) And (Lenstra, 1990) consider 
offline assignment of unit length jobs; (Avidor A., 2001), and (Coffman, 1976) consider 
the greedy assignment of weighted jobs under this measure, where the client-server graph 
is complete bipartite. 
They consider a set of U of n clients and a set V of m servers, then a server matching is a 
mapping M: U → V that assigns each client to a server. The number of clients assigned to 
server v in a (many to one) matching M is denoted by dM(v), the load of v in M. When the 
matching M is clear from the context, we will simply use the shortened notation d(v). Each 
client matched to v in the matching M experiences a latency λV(dM(v)). The cost of a 
matching M is the total latency of all the clients. 
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou in paper (Papadimitriou E. K., 1999) considered a 
transportation problem where n independent agents wish to rout their traffic through a 
network of m parallel edges. They studied the price of anarchy on unsplittable flow games. 
In the general version of this game we have n agents; agent i wants to transfer an amount 
wi of flow between a source si and a destination ti and chooses, as his strategy, a path from 
si to ti to transfer his flow. Unsplittable means agents are not allowed breaking their flow 
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and transferring it partially across more than one path. As a result, each edge e carries 
some amount of traffic, say le, going through it, and there would be a latency caused by 
this edge which is a function of le and is denoted by fe(le). Assume agent i is using path Pi 
to transfer his flow. The latency corresponding to him would be the sum of latencies over 
all edges in Pi, i.e.  
wi ∑e  Pife(li).         (2.8) 
The aim of each agent is to minimize his associated latency whereas the social objective is 
to minimize either the total latency or the maximum latency over all edges in the network. 
That is, within constant factors, the worst case network is the simplest one (the parallel 
links network). This implies that, for this family of networks, the network structure does 
not affect the quality of the outcome of the congestion games played on the network in an 
essential way. 
Panagopoulou and Spirakis (Spirakis, 2005) consider selfish routing in single commodity 
networks, where selfish users select paths to route their loads (represented by arbitrary 
integer weights). They consider identical delay functions for the links of the network. That 
work focuses also on an algorithm suggested in (Fotakis, 2005) ; this is a potential based 
algorithm for finding pure Nash equilibrium in such works. the analysis of this algorithm 
(Fotakis, 2005) has given an upper bound on its running time, which is polynomial in n 
(the number of users) and the sum W of their weights. This bound can be exponential in n 
when some weights are superpolynomial. Therefore, the algorithm is only known to be 
pseudo polynomial. The work of Panagopoulou and Spirakis (Spirakis, 2005) provides 
strong experimental evidence that this algorithm actually converges to a pure Nash 
equilibria in polynomial time in n (and, therefore, independent of the weights values). 
In (Vocking, 2005), Fischer and Vocking reexamined the question of worst case Nash 
Equilibria for the selfish routing game associated with the KP model (Papadimitriou E. K., 
1999), where n weighted jobs are allocated to m identical machines. Recall that Gairing et 
al (Gairing, 2005), had conjectured that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium is the worst Nash 
equilibrium for this game (with respect to the expected maximum load over all machines). 
The known algorithms for approximating the price of anarchy relied on proven case of that 
conjecture.  
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In (Vocking, 2005) the authors interesting present a counter example to the conjecture 
shows that fully mixed Nash equilibria cannot be generally used to approximate the price 
of anarchy within reasonable factors. In addition, they present an algorithm that constructs 
the so called concentrated Nash equilibria, which approximate the worst-case Nash 
equilibrium within constant factors. 
Although the work of Fischer and Vocking (Vocking, 2005) has disproved the fully mixed 
Nash equilibrium conjecture for the case of weighted users and identical links, the 
possibility that the conjecture holds for the case of identical users and arbitrary links is still 
open. 
 
25 
 
Chapter 3 
Game theory model for load balancing 
3.1 Load Balancing 
load balancing (www.wikipedia.org, 2008) is a technique (usually performed by load 
balancers) to spread work between two or more computers, network links, CPUs, hard 
drives, or other resources, in order to get optimal resource utilization, throughput, or 
response time. Using multiple components with load balancing, instead of a single 
component, may increase reliability through redundancy.  
3.2 Game theory as basic rule for load balancing 
Game theory is the branch of decision theory with interdependent decisions, and it is 
considered as the study of MultiAgent decision problem, from these facts, we can use the 
game theory to play the rule for realization the load balancing between servers. From the 
axiom of Nash equilibrium that we can get the equilibrium between any two players as the 
well-known ―Prisoners Dilemma‖ game shown in Table 3.1. This game involves two 
players, whose names simply A and B. In this basic game, each player must 
simultaneously choose one of the two possible actions: cooperation or aggression. The 
payoff for each player depends on both of their actions, as shown in Table 3.1. For each 
pair of actions, Table 3.1 lists two numbers, the first being A’s payoff and the second being 
B’s payoff. 
Table 3.1:  A game with pervasive incentives for aggression (the Prisoners’ Dilemma). 
 B cooperative B aggressive 
       A cooperative 0,0 -8,1
* 
       A aggressive 
*
1,-8 
*
-3,-3
* 
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The asterisks (*) here indicate the best payoff that each player could get in response to 
each possible action of the other player (Myerson, 2006). 
This game has an achievement to equilibrium between these players, so it could have best 
results in achievement the load balancing between servers through the MultiAgent system. 
3.3 MultiAgent system 
The goal of MultiAgent systems’ research is to find methods that allow us to build 
complex systems composed of autonomous agents  while operating on local knowledge 
and possessing only limited abilities, are nonetheless capable of enacting the desired global 
behaviors. We want to know how to take a description of what a system of agents should 
do and break it down into individual agent behaviors. At its most ambitious, MultiAgent 
systems aim to reverse-engineering emergent phenomena as typified by ant colonies, the 
economy, and the immune system. MultiAgent systems approach the problem using the 
well proven tools from game theory, Economics, and Biology. It supplements these with 
ideas and algorithms from artificial intelligence research, namely planning, reasoning 
methods, search methods, and machine learning. 
 
 These disparate influences lead to the development of many different approaches, some of 
which end up incompatible with each other. That is, it is sometimes not clear if two 
researchers are studying variations of the same problem or completely different problems. 
Still, the model that has thus far gained most attention, probably due to its flexibility as 
well as its well established roots in game theory and artificial intelligence, is that of 
modeling agents as utility maximizers who inhabit some kind of Markov decision process. 
3.3.1 Utility 
We generally assume that an agent’s preferences are captured by a utility function (Vidal, 
2007). This function provides a map from the states of the world or outcome of game to a 
real number. The bigger the number is, the more the agent likes that particular state. 
Speciﬁcally, given that S is the set of states in the world the agent can perceive then agent 
i’s utility function is of the form 
27 
 
U: S →R          (3.1) 
Notice that the states are deﬁned as those states of the world that the agent can perceive. 
For example, if a robot has only one sensor that feeds him a binary input, say 1 if it is 
bright and 0 if its dark, then that robot has a utility function deﬁned over only two states 
regardless of how complicated the real world might be. In practice, agents have 
sophisticated inputs and it is impractical to deﬁne a diﬀerent output for each input. Thus, 
must agents also end up mapping their raw inputs to a smaller set of world states. Creating 
this mapping function can be challenges as it requires a deep understanding of the problem 
setting. 
We can use utility functions to describe the behavior of almost every agent. Utility 
functions are also useful for capturing the various tradeoﬀs that an agent must make, along 
with the value or expected value of its actions. For example, we can say that a robot 
receives a certain payment for delivering a package but also incurs a cost in terms of the 
electricity used as well as the opportunity cost which he could have been delivering other 
packages. If they translate all these payments and costs into utility numbers then they can 
easily study the tradeoﬀs among them. 
Once they have deﬁned a utility function for all the agents then all they have to do is to 
take actions which maximize their utility. As in Economics, they use word selfish to refer 
to a rational agent that wants to maximize its utility. Notice that this use is slightly diﬀerent 
from the everyday usage of the word which often implies a desire to harm others, a true 
selﬁsh agent simply cares exclusively about its utility. The use of selﬁsh agents does not 
preclude the implementation of cooperative MultiAgent systems. They can view a 
cooperative MultiAgent system as one where the agents’ utility functions have been 
deﬁned in such a way so that the agents seem to cooperate. For example, if an agent 
receives a higher utility for helping other agents then the resulting behavior will seem 
cooperative to an observer even though the agent is acting selﬁshly. Since they are 
concerned with building agents, they needn’t be distracted by the question of whether or 
not humans are really selﬁsh or not. 
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3.3.2 Utility is Not Money 
Note that while utility represents an agent’s preferences which are not necessarily equated 
with money. In fact, the utility of money has been found to be roughly logarithmic. For 
example, say Bill has $100 million while Tim has $0 in the bank. They both contemplate 
the possibility of winning one million dollars. Clearly, that extra million will make a 
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in Tim’s lifestyle while Bill’s lifestyle will remain largely 
unchanged, thus Tim’s utility for the same million dollars is much larger than Bill’s. There 
is experimental evidence that shows this holds for most people.  Very roughly, people’s 
utility for smaller amounts of money is linear but for larger amounts it becomes 
logarithmic. Note that here we are considering the marginal utility or money, that is, it is 
the utility for the next million dollars. We assume that both Bill and Tim have the same 
utility for their ﬁrst million dollars. (Vidal, 2007) 
3.3.3 Expected Utility 
Once we have utility functions we must then determine how the agents will use them. They 
assume each agent has some sensors which it can use to determine the state of the world 
and take action. These actions can lead to new states of the world. For example, an agent 
senses its location and decides to move forward one foot. Of course, these sensors and 
eﬀectors might not operate perfectly: the agent might not move exactly one foot or its 
sensors might be noisy 
3.3.4 Markov Decision Processes  
So far we have considered only a ﬁxed state of the world. But, the reality in most cases is 
that agents inhabit an environment whose state changes either because of the agent’s action 
or due to some external event. They can think of the agent sensing the state of the world 
then taking an action which leads to a new state. They also make the further simplifying 
assumption that the choice of the new state therefore depends only on the agent’s current 
state and the agent’s action. This idea is formally captured by a Markov decision process or 
MDP. 
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3.3.5 MultiAgent Markov Decision Processes  
The MDP model represents the problems of only one agent, not of a MultiAgent system. 
There have been several ways of transforming an MDP into a MultiAgent MDP. The 
easiest way is simply to place all the other agents’ eﬀects into the transition function. That 
is, assume they don’t really exist as entities and are merely part of the environment. This 
technique can work for simple cases where the agents are not changing their behavior since 
the transition function in an MDP must be ﬁxed. Unfortunately, agents that change their 
policies over time, either because of their own learning or because of input from the users, 
are very common. 
3.3.6 MultiAgent system and game theory model for load balancing  
In our model we have agents , every agent has local knowledge and possessing limited 
abilities, and because the most commonly used problem representation in game theory is 
the payoff matrix which shows the utility the agents will receive given their actions, in this 
game, we assume that the players have common knowledge of the utilities that all players 
can receive, and we can also assume that the players take their actions simultaneously, so 
every agent (client) from his payoff can determine a suitable strategy (server) to select, and 
then to achieve the desired load balancing that we model using Netlogo simulation 
program. 
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Chapter 4 
The Model 
 
4.1 Our Model 
In our model we have dynamic number of servers and dynamic number of clients, we 
innovate a dynamic payoff matrix to evaluate the Nash equilibrium point, we will use the 
Netlogo simulation to implement this situation. Because of this dynamic clients that some 
clients arrive and other departure, for that we can implement this as queue, also we must 
take this behavior into consideration to apply the suitable distribution. 
Every server has different speed, in our model each client needs request from server but we 
fulfill the game theory fundamentals, so every client chooses a server not depending on the 
speed only, but every client must not play unilateral. 
Our model use the M/D/c queuing system in which the arrival has a Poisson distribution 
and the time spent on servers is deterministic and the number of servers can be two or four 
or six.  
In my hypothesis we assume the following variables. 
   s1
1
 : speed for server 1 
   s2: speed for server 2 
   t1: estimate time for client 1 to execute instructions. 
   t2: estimate time for client 2 to execute instructions. 
We innovated a dynamic normal form matrix (payoff matrix) based on the facts that we 
can acquire from both clients and servers. After we compute the payoff matrix the 
GAMBIT toolset was used to attain the Nash equilibrium point.  
                                                             
1
  In our thesis we assume that every execution time that need 1 second will spend this execution over 
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So the payoff for the two clients will be as following: 
Table 4.1: The payoff for two clients by meaning of variables 
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Where 
   a = If (t1 > t2) and (s1 > s2) then a =
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1
2
t
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For (s1 > s2) and (t1 > t2) the payoff matrix will be as following: 
Table 4.2: The payoff for two clients by meaning of variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For (s1 > s2) and (t1 < t2) the payoff matrix will be as following: 
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Table 4.3: The 
payoff for two 
clients by 
meaning of variables for S1 > S2 
 
 
 
 
 
For (s1 < s2) and (t1 > t2) the payoff matrix will be as following: 
Table 4.4: The payoff for two clients by meaning of variables for S1 < S2 
 
 
                
 
 
 
   For (s1 < s2) and (t1 < t2) the payoff matrix will be as following: 
Table 4.5: The payoff for two clients by meaning of variables for S1 < S2 
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We will now use several estimated times for the clients and several speeds for the servers 
and in different order to explore the efficiency for the new method in load balancing: 
4.1.1 Objective for the following example  
In the following example we have four variables: 
 t1 : estimation time for client 1 
 t2 : estimation time for client 2 
 s1 : speed for server 1 
 s2 : speed for server 2 
In the following example we have sixteen clients; every two clients have estimation 
time to serve their requests on several servers that have different speeds.  This example 
will illustrate the difference in time for the two models (Nash model and sequential 
model). 
Example: 
Table 4.6: This table compare in time between Sequential and Nash for several clients 
No. t1 t2 s1 s2 Nash point t1 on 
server 
t2 on server T on Nash T on 
seq 
1 30 17 3 2 (18,21) Server 1 Server 2 10 10 
2 30 17 2 3 (18,21) Server 2 Server 1 10 15 
3 30 20 3 1 (10,15) Server 1 Server 1 10 20 
4 15 12 2.5 3 (25,26) Server 2 Server 2 5 6 
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5 6 6 2 3 (50,50) Server 2 Server 2 2 3 
6 12 15 3 2.5 (26,25) Server 2 Server 1 5 6 
7 17 30 3 2 (21,18) Server 2 Server 1 10 15 
8 25 30 2 3 (12,10) Server 2 Server 2 10 12.5 
 
In No. 1 the payoff matrix will be as following: 
Table 4.7: The Nash equilibrium point in upper right corner 6 
 
 
 
 
1 
In No.2 the payoff matrix will be as following: 
Table 4.8: The Nash equilibrium point in lower left corner7 
 
 
 
2 
 
In No.3 the payoff matrix will be as following: 
Table 4.9: The Nash equilibrium point in upper left corner8 
                                                             
2
 The Nash equilibrium point is in bold font. 
  Client 2 
  Server 1 Server2 
Client 1 
Server 1 10  18 18            21
2
 
Server 2 4  10 7  12 
  Client 2 
  Server 1 Server2 
Client 1 
Server 1 7  12 4  10 
Server 2 18  21 10  18 
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  Client 2 
  Server 1 Server2 
Client 1 
Server 1 10  15 15  8 
Server 2 2  10 3  5 
 
In No.4 the payoff matrix will be as following: 
Table 4.10: The Nash equilibrium point in lower left corner9 
 
    
 
 
3 
In No.5 the payoff matrix will be as following: 
Table 4.11: The Nash equilibrium point in lower right corner10 
  Client 2 
 
  Server 1 Server2 
Client 1 
Server 1 33  33 33  50 
Server 2 50  33 50  50 
4 
In No.6 the payoff matrix will be as following: 
Table 4.12: The Nash equilibrium point in lower left corner11  5 
  Client 2 
 
  Server 1 Server2 
Client 1 Server 1 25  20 31  21 
  Client 2 
 
  Server 1 Server2 
Client 1 
Server 1 17  21 13  20 
Server 2 25  26 20  25 
36 
 
Server 2 26  25 21  17 
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In No.7 the payoff matrix will be as following: 
Table 4.13: The Nash equilibrium point in lower left corner12 
  Client 2 
 
  Server 1 Server2 
Client 1 
Server 1 18  10 31  12 
Server 2 21  18 12  7 
6 
In No.8 the payoff matrix will be as following: 
Table 4.14: The Nash equilibrium point in lower left corner13  7 
 
      
 
 
Finally, we implement this situation by using Netlogo V.4.0.2, so we assume that we have 
two servers and dynamic number of clients that need requests form servers, and to explore 
the difference between the Nash solution and sequential solution to obtain the optimal load 
balancing, we use two models, the first for the Nash equilibrium and the second for the 
sequential one. 
4.1.1.1 Discussion for the previous example  
From the previous example, we can draw a conclusion that from the eight runs we have 
one run only gives the same execution time, three runs the Nash model have a surpass by 
10%, one run the Nash model surpasses by about 25%, two runs the Nash model surpass 
by about 50%, and finally one run the Nash model surpasses by about 100%.  
  Client 2 
 
  Server 1 Server2 
Client 1 
Server 1 8  7 10  12 
Server 2 14  8 12  10 
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Chapter 5 
Implementing the Model 
 
5.1 Implementing the model 
The main purpose of our model is to serve the clients that arrive in a minimum time, we 
assume that every client arrives and holds his estimation time, in our model we deal with 
every two clients to determine which client to choose suitable server in order to achieve 
load balancing for the whole clients. 
So our goal is to construct a model to tell client to match the best server in order to achieve 
load balancing using Nash equilibrium which is the central concern of game theory, to 
enhance the system overall and to optimize the time needed to complete his request. 
  
  
Figure 5.1: The environment for the model of load balancing, at left side the 
servers and at the right side the clients 
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The environment setup in our model which we have from two to six servers, each one has a 
different speed, and we have a dynamic number of clients from two to thirty, each one has 
an estimation time, the experiments here reported have been programmed in Netlogo 4.0.2 
(Figure 5.1 ). 
 
The figure A.1 in the appendix show the interface for our simulation model 
The typical simulation would have a number of clients and servers, where each client has a 
request, we express this request by a red line from client to specify server. Then it would 
run until the whole clients finish their requests.  
The results we present in this thesis are mostly taken from typical runs, so the monitor 
labeled with "Total Time" denoted to the total time consumed by the all clients. Although 
we run 20 experiments and averaged the result, we obtain a desired outcome for the all 
experiments. 
In figure A.1 we have the following buttons: 
1- Switch with label Run-Nash if it is on it will run the experiment in Nash; otherwise it 
will run the experiment in sequential balancing. 
2- We have two sliders for the number of servers and clients. 
3- We have one monitor to show for us the total time spent on servers. 
We do twenty random experiments;  
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Figure 5.2: This graph represents the number of clients versus time under different number 
of servers. 
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Figure 5.3: Sequential load balancing. 
 
From Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 we note the following: 
When the number  of clients less than 10 clients, the difference in time less than 5 seconds, 
and when the number of clients is more than 15 clients the difference will be more than 10 
seconds between Nash load balancing and sequential load balancing. 
Second we note that when we immigrate from two servers to four servers the difference 
will be more than 60 seconds, when we immigrate to 6 servers the difference will be less 
than 30 seconds. 
Finally, our plot was linear multiplying with a constant number, so we can predict what 
will be the time at any circumstances. 
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Objective for Experiment1 
In this experiment we have six clients and two servers have different speed, we 
assume that every two clients arrive at the same t ime, we illustrate in this  
experiment how the clients will behave and  to decide which strategy (server) 
to select through strategic form table (normal form table) de pending on Nash 
equilibr ium point.  
Experiment 1 
 The following table shows the six clients, and two servers (speed 3 GHz and the second 
one 2.5 GHz respectively), the six clients each of one has the following estimation time 
respectively,  
Table 5.1: We have 6 clients and six different estimation times in sequential order. 
Client Number Estimation Time in Seconds 
1 15 
2 18 
3 20 
4 22 
5 25 
6 30 
 
In our model using Netlogo we have two methods to make a comparison between them, the 
first one sequential load balancing that every client is served by the first server and the 
second client is served by the second one respectively and so on for the remaining clients. 
The second method was the Nash load balancing which is the core of our thesis that 
depends on normal form table. 
If the switch Run-Nash is off and we push the Setup button then we push the Start button, 
after finished we can see the result on the Monitor Total time 49.91 seconds Figure A.2. 
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If we run the same experiment but we turn the Switch Run-Nash on we can observe the 
Monitor Total Time will be 47.72 seconds, Figure A.4.  
So in our Nash model we can save 2.19 seconds. 
To trace how clients choose a suitable server as following: 
Client 1 has estimation time 15 seconds and the second client 2 has 18 seconds, if we use 
the normal form table we have the following values: 
Table 5.2: The Nash equilibrium point in lower left corner 
20  17 24  17 
20  20 17  14 
 
The second column and the first row have Nash equilibrium which is the client 1 chooses 
server 2 and client 2 chooses server 1. 
Next we have client 3 20 seconds and client 4 22 seconds which give us the following 
values: 
Table 5.3: The Nash equilibrium point in upper right corner 
15  13 16  12 
13  15 12  11 
 
The Nash exists in column one and row one that's mean that client 1 chooses server 1 and 
client 2 chooses server 1 also.  
Finally we have client 5 25 seconds and client 6 30 seconds which give us the following 
values: 
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Table 5.4: The Nash equilibrium point in lower left corner 
11  9 13  10 
12  11 10  8 
 
The Nash exists in column one and row two that's mean that client 1 chooses server 2 and 
client 2 chooses server 1. 
We must take in consideration that the servers have some degradation while the clients 
serve by these servers. 
Discussion for Experiment 1: 
From these inputs we can conclude a normal form table, and from this table we can orient 
each client to serve his request by a suitable server, finally, when we use the Nash model 
the time used by clients was 47.72 seconds, where the time used by clients in sequential 
model was 49.91, the difference was 2.19 seconds. 
Objective for Experiment 2  
In the following experiment we use six clients, and two servers, in this 
experiment the est imat ion time for the clients could be the same, we assume 
every two clients arrive at the same t ime.  
Experiment 2: 
In the second experiment we have six clients and two servers the first server speed 3 GHz 
and the second one 2.3 GHz, the six clients each of one has the following estimation time 
respectively, 
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Table 5.5: We have 6 clients and six estimation time, some estimation time was equal 
Client Number Estimation Time in Seconds 
1 15 
2 12 
3 10 
4 12 
5 15 
6 12 
 
If the switch Run-Nash is off and we push the Setup button then we push the Start button 
after finished we can see the result on the Monitor Total time 16.39 seconds Figure A.3 . 
If we run the same experiment but we turn the Switch Run-Nash on we can observe the 
Monitor Total Time will be 14.9 seconds Figure A.6. 
So in our Nash model we can save 1.49 seconds. 
To trace how clients choose a suitable server as following: 
Client 1 has estimation time 15 seconds and the second client 2 has 12 seconds, if we use 
the normal form table we have the following values: 
Table 5.6: The Nash equilibrium point in upper left corner 
20  25 25  24 
12  20 15  19 
 
The first column and the first row have Nash equilibrium which is the client 1 choose 
server 1 and client 2 choose server 1 also, in this case we note that the two clients choose 
the same server to get best utilization and less time for the two clients. 
Next we have client 3 10 seconds and client 4 12 seconds which give us the following 
values: 
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Table 5.7: The Nash equilibrium point in lower left corner 
28  23 34  23 
28  28 23  19 
 
The Nash exists in column one and row two that's mean that client 1 choose server 2 and 
client 2 choose server 1.  
Finally we have client 5 15 seconds and client 6 12 seconds which give us the following 
values: 
Table 5.8: The Nash equilibrium point in upper right corner 
18  23 23  23 
12  18 15  18 
 
The Nash exists in column two and row one that's mean that client 1 choose server 1 and 
client 2 choose server 2. 
Discussion for Experiment 2: 
In this experiment we use also six clients but some clients have the same estimation time, it 
doesn’t exceed 16 seconds, and two servers have different speeds, from the results we 
obtain we can observe that the Nash model has less time for serving the clients with 
opposite to the sequential model, Nash model 14.9 seconds and the sequential model 16.39 
seconds, the difference was 1.49 seconds in this experiment. 
Objective for Experiment 3  
In the last experiment we have eight clients and two servers, the first server 
has less speed than the other one, and we illustrate in this experiment the 
performance of the Nash model over the sequent ial model.  
  
47 
 
Table 5.9: Eight clients every one has an estimation time 
Client Number Estimation Time in Seconds 
1 45 
2 30 
3 18 
4 14 
5 13 
6 15 
7 8 
8 8 
 
Experiment 3: 
In the third experiment we have eight clients and two servers the first server speed 2.7 GHz 
and the second one 3 GHz respectively, the eight clients each of one has the following 
estimation time respectively,  
If the switch Run-Nash is off and we push the Setup button then we push the Start button 
after finished we can see the result on the Monitor Total time 32.12 seconds Figure A.5. 
If we run the same experiment but we turn the Switch Run-Nash on we can observe the 
Monitor Total Time will be 29.37 seconds Figure A.7 
So in our Nash model we can save 2.75 seconds. 
To trace how clients choose a suitable server as following: 
Client 1 has estimation time 45 seconds and the second client 2 has 30 seconds, if we use 
the normal form table we have the following values: 
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Table 5.10: The Nash equilibrium point in lower left corner 
6  9 4  7 
10  14 7  10 
 
The first column and the second row have Nash equilibrium which is the client 1 choose 
server 2 and client 2 choose server 1  
Next we have client 3 18 seconds and client 4 14 seconds which give us the following 
values: 
Table 5.11: The Nash equilibrium point in lower left corner 
14  19 11  16 
21  24 16  21 
 
The Nash exists in column one and row two that's mean that client 1 choose server 2 and 
client 2 choose server 1.  
Next we have client 5 13 seconds and client 6 15 seconds which give us the following 
values: 
Table 5.12: The Nash equilibrium point in upper right corner 
19  17 22  22 
25  19 22  19 
 
The Nash exists in column two and row one that's mean that client 1 choose server 1 and 
client 2 choose server 2. 
Finally we have client 7 8 seconds and client 8 8 seconds which give us the following 
values: 
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Table 5.13: The Nash equilibrium point in lower right corner 
30  30 30  34 
34  30 34  34 
The Nash exists in column two and row two that's mean that client 1 choose server 2 and 
client 2 choose server 2 also. 
Objectives for Experiment 3: 
In the last experiment we use eight clients two of them have the same estimation time, and 
we have two servers, the first one has less speed contrary to the first two experiments, from 
the results we obtain we can observe that our Nash model also has less time for serving the 
clients with opposite to the sequential model, the time we save by Nash model was 2.75 
seconds for the whole experiment. 
Finally, we can summarize these results in the following table, that show the time was 
saved (in seconds) in the last row by the second method (Nash Equilibrium): 
Table 5.14: The summary for the three experiments 
Method Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
Sequential Balancing 21.82 16.39 32.12 
Nash equilibrium 18.83 14.9 29.37 
Time saved /in seconds 2.99 1.49 2.75 
5.2 Discuss the results 
From the result we obtain we notice that the total time for 2 servers 30 clients 416.34 
seconds and for 4 servers 30 clients 350.25 seconds, the difference will be 66.09 seconds, 
and the total time for 6 servers 30 clients 324.58 seconds, the difference will be 25.67 
seconds, so we can see the difference when we immigrate from 2 to 4 servers is greater 
than when we immigrate from 4 to 6 servers, that Nash load balancing cannot work. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
6.1 Conclusion and Future Work 
From game theory fundamentals (chapter 2), we computed the Nash equilibrium which we 
discussed in (chapter 2.12.2) to have a rational choice (chapter 1.2) for every client,  that 
clients are rational and therefore game theory predicts their behavior well. If game theory 
is correct for this reason, it could reap the additional benefit of great stability and achieve 
load balancing between servers. This equilibrium that makes the game to have rational 
strategy in any decision, it also accomplishes the balancing of load (chapter 3, 3.1) 
between servers through a new technique based on dynamic strategic normal form (chapter 
4, the model) that guide the players to choose suitable strategies. 
In this thesis we develop a dynamic normal form table (As we introduce in Chapter 4) to 
explore the best server matching for the clients. Due to the complexity of solving the Nash 
equilibrium, we use the GAMBIT toolset to derive the results. We ran some simulations to 
test the performance of our system (Chapter 5). The experimental results show that the 
new technique for server matching gives us preferable results from the previous one 
"sequential load balancing"(Chapter 4). In our simulations we use the Netlogo program to 
model our system.  The techniques we explore are quite flexible, and relaxations of the 
assumptions in the model lead to interesting future research topics.   
We have demonstrated that our mathematical model (Chapter 4, Our model section) and 
our simulation agrees with each other by showing that the Nash equilibrium that exists in a 
normal form table gives us best results and this is achieved by the simulation(Chapter 5, 
Implementing the model section). 
Our main results contribute an important idea to make the normal form table more dynamic 
to give us a best server matching for every two clients. 
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We compare between two techniques (Chapter 5), the first one sequential load balancing 
and between the new models Nash load balancing, we show the improvement of the 
performance for the new model. For 2 servers the performance is 3.19% according to table 
A.4, for 4 servers the performance is 4.59%, and for 6 servers the performance is 3.98%. 
Finally, our model is linear as shown in figure.5.2.  
6.2 Future Work 
As future work, our current model does not consider a non atomic
3
 version of data, so it 
could be possible to work in this direction. Other future work may include the pure Nash 
equilibrium for the dynamic situation that was implemented through Netlogo 
simulation. Finally, we can extend this model as a MultiAgent system to have dynamic 
number of clients and servers and not to be restricted by the time requested by the clients.  
                                                             
3
  Non atomic version that client can choose more than one server to access one request. 
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Appendixes 
Twenty random experiments; we have the following results (for 2 servers): 
Table A. 1: Twenty random experiments done for two servers. 
 2 Clients 4 Clients 6 Clients 8 Clients 10 Clients 12 Clients 
 Nash Sequential Nash Sequential Nash Sequential Nash Sequential Nash Sequential Nash Sequential 
1 12.67 12.67 27.8 28.73 47.39 48.5 73.92 76.25 108.1 109.96 136.27 138.52 
2 12.67 12.67 27.8 28.74 47.39 48.59 73.98 76.32 108.22 111.3 136.78 139.29 
3 12.67 12.67 27.8 28.79 47.64 48.89 74.05 76.35 108.51 111.69 137.77 139.81 
4 12.67 12.67 27.8 28.79 47.65 48.89 74.48 76.4 109.76 112.3 137.88 139.85 
5 12.67 12.67 27.8 28.87 47.7 48.96 74.5 76.41 109.78 112.32 137.9 139.9 
6 12.67 12.67 28.68 29.01 47.86 48.97 75.01 76.42 109.95 112.84 137.96 140.71 
7 12.67 12.67 28.68 29.01 47.9 49.01 75.09 76.5 110.19 112.87 138.01 140.78 
8 12.67 12.67 28.68 29.04 47.99 49.1 75.13 76.52 110.35 112.98 138.04 140.99 
9 12.67 12.67 28.79 29.12 48.19 49.17 75.18 77.14 110.42 112.98 138.09 141.02 
10 12.67 12.67 28.79 29.12 48.54 49.33 75.25 77.19 110.44 113.05 138.85 141.03 
11 12.67 13 28.79 29.15 48.65 49.4 75.25 77.35 110.53 113.08 139.04 141.28 
12 12.67 13 28.79 29.31 48.71 49.62 75.32 77.72 110.62 113.39 139.18 141.52 
13 12.67 13 28.79 29.4 48.71 49.8 75.4 77.97 110.71 113.5 139.24 141.55 
14 12.67 13 28.79 29.46 48.72 49.88 75.45 78.07 111.06 113.89 139.44 142.3 
15 12.67 13 28.79 29.54 48.72 49.94 75.6 78.11 111.12 113.96 139.58 142.72 
16 12.67 13 28.79 29.59 48.77 50.08 75.91 78.21 111.64 114.02 139.7 142.8 
17 12.67 13 28.95 29.59 48.83 50.19 76.1 78.26 111.7 114.35 139.77 143.58 
18 12.67 13 28.95 29.62 48.86 50.23 76.27 78.63 111.88 115.49 140.51 144.08 
19 12.67 13 28.95 29.62 49 50.26 76.3 78.66 112.55 115.62 140.57 144.27 
20 12.67 13 28.95 29.62 49.17 50.31 76.71 78.76 113.1 115.85 141.4 145.79 
Av 12.67 12.84 28.56 29.21 48.32 49.46 75.25 77.36 110.53 113.27 138.80 141.59 
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Table A.1 
 14 Clients 16 Clients 18 Clients 20 Clients 22 Clients 24 Clients 
 Nash Sequential Nash Sequential Nash Sequential Nash Sequential Nash Sequential Nash Sequential 
1 145.26 153.67 170.39 174.84 194.83 201.86 219.5 225.38 261.9 266.22 291.72 299.71 
2 146.96 153.08 171.05 175.08 195.43 201.91 220.57 226.2 263.08 268.55 292.73 303.04 
3 147.39 154.37 172.17 176.94 196.1 202.82 221.08 226.78 263.48 269.37 293.11 305.67 
4 147.72 153.13 172.48 176.97 197.67 203.02 222.48 227.13 264.08 269.54 294.71 305.85 
5 147.94 149.39 172.69 177.52 197.78 203.7 222.9 228.13 265.45 270.21 295.52 305.89 
6 148.12 151.49 173.07 178.05 197.9 203.92 222.94 228.59 265.47 271.64 296 306.63 
7 148.44 153.57 173.22 178.17 197.95 204.39 224.13 229.38 265.67 272.53 296.98 307.48 
8 148.59 154.85 173.49 179.66 198.32 205.07 224.13 231.37 266.04 275.33 297.45 307.64 
9 148.73 152.08 174.17 180.15 198.49 205.56 224.29 231.97 266.39 276.47 298.15 308.35 
10 149.18 158.73 174.35 180.59 198.67 205.63 224.87 232.15 267.34 276.99 298.5 308.39 
11 149.7 155.04 174.81 182.18 199.48 205.77 225.04 232.76 267.34 277.7 298.72 309.31 
12 149.93 153.99 174.89 182.64 200.7 206.04 227.25 232.96 267.4 278.02 299.53 310.13 
13 149.95 151.76 175.04 183.31 200.77 206.55 227.3 233.06 268.29 280.23 299.81 310.66 
14 149.95 158.23 175.4 183.83 200.92 207.17 228.18 234.42 268.97 281.35 301.53 311.03 
15 150.38 152.2 175.54 184.02 201.3 208.33 229.04 235.13 270.3 282.09 302.49 311.44 
16 150.67 152.86 175.89 184.09 201.51 208.84 229.05 235.91 270.31 283.44 302.93 314.21 
17 150.78 150.11 175.9 185.16 202.93 212.03 229.57 236.32 271.77 285.15 303.33 314.4 
18 151.04 156.98 177.39 186.76 203.04 212.46 229.86 237.19 272.15 286.37 304.39 315.64 
19 151.45 148.97 178.95 188.11 203.8 213.54 230.02 238.75 272.25 286.91 304.77 320.76 
20 151.9 156.2 180.3 190.78 203.91 214.16 232.21 240.82 272.63 287.91 304.98 321.65 
Av 149.2 153.54 174.56 181.44 199.58 206.64 225.72 232.22 267.52 277.30 298.87 309.89 
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Table A.1 
 
 26 Clients 28 Clients 30 Clients 
 Nash Sequential Nash  Sequential Nash Sequential 
1 324.78 335.07 354.81 372.7 404.53 434.21 
2 327.92 336.88 358.21 372.9 406.16 438.81 
3 328.1 338.71 360.33 374.46 407.03 434.53 
4 330.85 338.83 364.6 374.86 407.99 425.22 
5 331.32 340.83 364.67 380.82 411.34 429.36 
6 332.7 341.79 367.46 381.5 412.02 415.14 
7 333.02 341.85 368.09 381.86 414.1 428.61 
8 334.17 342.38 368.39 383.85 415.6 420.74 
9 334.17 343.27 368.53 384.48 415.72 444.81 
10 335.12 343.5 369.97 384.9 415.73 426.42 
11 335.18 344.8 370.11 385.64 415.85 430.44 
12 335.3 345.87 371.73 388.22 417.73 411.23 
13 335.9 347.49 371.9 388.26 418.01 410.27 
14 336.41 348.68 372.48 389.3 420.7 447.55 
15 339.38 349.29 372.58 389.59 420.97 446.21 
16 340.25 349.52 375.76 389.87 421.12 442.66 
17 340.9 350.61 377.1 394.74 422.23 416.65 
18 341.25 350.86 379.19 395.16 422.88 426.68 
19 341.99 355.42 379.9 395.77 423.35 419.84 
20 342.22 356.14 380.75 397.75 433.76 433.96 
Av 335.1 345.09 369.83 385.33 416.34 429.17 
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And we do twenty random experiments; we have the following results (for 4 servers): 
Table A. 2: Twenty random experiments done for four servers. 
 2 Clients 4 Clients 6 Clients 8 Clients 10 Clients 12 Clients 
 Nash Seq. Nash Seq. Nash Seq. Nash Seq. Nash Seq. Nash Seq. 
1 12.02 13.66 27.24 29.52 46.31 49.58 72.9 77.21 106 113.09 131.56 137.81 
2 12.02 13.19 27.24 29.28 46.5 50.03 72 76.02 105.66 113.77 131.06 141.29 
3 12.02 13.19 27.27 30.3 46.64 52.7 72.83 78.2 106.34 111.28 132.11 139.21 
4 12.02 13.14 27.25 30.12 46.47 49.85 73.71 77.24 105.47 116.4 132.08 136.23 
5 12.02 14.7 27.24 29.66 46.9 48.17 71.97 76.95 105.44 114.94 131.5 140.08 
6 12.02 14.05 27.39 29.62 46.29 50.68 73.07 77.14 104.67 112.81 131.46 138.5 
7 12.02 14.05 27.25 29.46 46.35 49.53 73.03 78.94 106.6 111.72 133.26 136.95 
8 12.02 14.05 27.21 30.01 46.42 50 72.66 77.08 106.96 113.23 131.69 139.73 
9 12.02 13.66 27.27 30.21 46.52 49.41 72.55 76.77 105.93 107.03 133.19 137.73 
10 12.02 14.05 27.31 29.75 46.75 49.53 73.58 76.81 105.53 112.63 131.87 140.52 
11 12.02 12.14 27.25 29.66 46.97 48.19 72.43 75.72 104.89 112.14 130.92 139.91 
12 12.02 14.7 27.27 29.28 46.4 51.15 73.57 77.98 104.85 114.56 132.07 138.84 
13 12.02 12.14 27.24 29.42 46.32 51.37 72.76 76.54 104.46 114.35 131.34 136.69 
14 12.02 13.66 27.24 29.75 46.43 49.45 73.05 75.26 104.08 111.15 131.84 141.33 
15 12.02 13.19 27.39 29.52 46.63 50.36 72.24 76.39 104.76 115.62 131.48 137.63 
16 12.02 12.67 27.31 29.85 46.44 48.33 72.97 76.01 105.4 116.18 132.45 136.55 
17 12.02 13.19 27.21 29.66 46.37 48.66 73.35 76.86 105.86 112.68 133.11 139.8 
18 12.02 14.52 27.27 29.96 46.38 47.75 72.83 76.94 105.19 112.37 131.03 138.46 
19 12.02 12.14 27.21 29.32 47.07 49.9 74.14 76.73 105.92 112.64 130.18 141.31 
20 12.02 12.67 27.27 29.28 46.53 50.29 72.51 75.66 105.93 112.84 130.67 139.71 
Av 12.02 13.44 27.27 29.68 46.53 49.75 72.91 76.82 105.50 113.07 131.74 138.91 
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Table A.2 
 14 Clients 16 Clients 18 Clients 20 Clients 22 Clients 24 Clients 
 Nash Sequential Nash Sequential Nash Sequential Nash Sequential Nash Sequential Nash Sequential 
1 142.64 146.13 165.85 175.77 184.9 197.23 205.77 217.54 243.99 251.31 267.6 280.02 
2 141.61 148.89 164.71 176.35 186.88 195.37 206.13 216.18 239.75 248.45 265.8 276.6 
3 141.34 147.42 165.59 167.4 186.27 194.95 207.28 217.17 242.41 248.58 269.89 277.89 
4 143.22 150.06 162.94 174.82 189.42 191.25 206.05 217.17 242.68 256.68 270.22 284.12 
5 141.96 150.79 164.86 172.5 187.43 195.85 211.76 217.11 241.83 257.1 266.6 283.73 
6 144.02 148.51 165.55 169.27 185.03 198.28 207.37 218.26 241.79 255.77 270.12 271.96 
7 140.83 146.83 166.82 173.23 184.12 198.45 209.22 214.64 241.22 253.51 269.13 275.83 
8 140.67 151.46 164.9 175.28 185.59 198.73 207.73 218.62 239.84 257.36 264.68 283.42 
9 140.24 149.3 165.16 173.77 186.3 195.46 204.55 214.48 239.77 252.67 268.33 277.17 
10 143.33 151.5 162.02 172.84 184.09 199.03 205.86 215.87 241.7 254.36 267.8 279.83 
11 143.72 151.79 164.13 175.03 184.97 191.25 207.1 218.86 244.53 251.17 266.6 276.98 
12 141.77 148.28 164.13 166.76 185.47 197.26 207.32 217.15 242.12 252.11 270.64 281.32 
13 141.28 147.32 164.32 171.26 185.6 197.63 208.18 221.17 240 250.19 267.87 281.96 
14 141.02 150.73 162.85 175.33 187.15 195.88 203.5 212.91 238.92 254.15 270.18 284.76 
15 141.79 150.05 165.31 170.46 187.6 190.86 208.38 217.8 243.76 255.76 266.91 279.11 
16 141.35 148.11 164.47 175.49 186.13 196.8 204.19 215.35 241.99 256.89 267.09 277.95 
17 140.63 149.79 164.42 172.16 183.47 194.96 205.44 218.54 239.65 252.17 266.72 281.03 
18 140.89 148.6 165.23 174.88 184.56 195.6 211.88 214.08 243.53 243.37 270.19 276.98 
19 140.05 148.45 164.51 169.79 186.37 191.96 206.59 214.44 243.55 252.16 267.48 282.82 
20 141.41 152.32 162.44 171.41 186.39 191.27 206.07 217.54 240.82 250.24 267.55 281.35 
Av 141.69 149.32 164.51 172.69 185.89 195.40 207.02 216.74 241.69 252.70 268.07 279.74 
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Table A.2 
 26 Clients 28 Clients 30 Clients 
 Nash Sequential Nash  Sequential Nash Sequential 
1 293.22 308.52 317.67 335.2 345.46 371.95 
2 291.82 301.49 315.89 335.51 349.4 362.52 
3 295 300.82 315.72 336.61 351.49 359.58 
4 296.95 302.36 317.22 334.22 346.81 359.82 
5 293.14 299.62 315.08 324.75 350.35 358.67 
6 294.49 310.39 324.68 338.91 349.34 370.62 
7 291.31 313.39 320.14 325.9 347.56 363.52 
8 294.49 314.55 323.53 326.35 356.56 371.27 
9 293.16 306.92 316.23 332.96 354.54 362.06 
10 292.25 301.98 320.36 331.38 349.57 361.42 
11 293.95 303.62 319.88 332.41 350.24 372.92 
12 294.85 301.49 321.64 330.97 347.47 359.74 
13 291.38 302.24 319.67 337.9 355.77 364.06 
14 295.39 300.17 319.16 334.32 347.87 370.68 
15 289.15 309.27 320.32 334.03 351.75 369.34 
16 291.38 306.57 321.39 326.44 353.93 365.03 
17 290.41 302.25 320.33 331.08 347.84 370.32 
18 292.75 309.08 322.71 326.47 351.68 365.5 
19 296.96 303.54 316.74 328.74 346.37 362.68 
20 290.57 314.46 313.17 328.47 350.96 362.12 
Av 293.13 305.64 319.08 331.63 350.25 365.19 
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And we do twenty random experiments; we have the following results (for 6 servers): 
Table A. 3: Twenty random experiments done for six servers 
 2 Clients 4 Clients 6 Clients 8 Clients 10 Clients 12 Clients 
 Nash Seq. Nash Seq. Nash Seq. Nash Seq. Nash Seq. Nash Seq. 
1 11.84 12.22 26.89 29.55 45.4 48.44 70.41 77.27 101.81 108.78 126.17 135.79 
2 11.84 13.56 26.79 28.58 45.45 49.1 70 72.92 102.58 110 127.26 132.92 
3 11.84 12.9 26.94 29.13 45.34 47.81 70.31 77.42 102.19 107.82 126.1 133.66 
4 11.84 13.7 26.89 28.47 45.16 48.89 69.93 75.85 102.35 106.78 126.65 134.67 
5 11.84 13 26.79 30.38 45.2 48.44 70.21 73.66 102.45 107.47 126.61 132.71 
6 11.84 13.14 26.83 29.4 45.24 49.33 69.98 72.73 101.84 109.1 125.94 131.94 
7 11.84 13.66 26.79 29.75 45.2 48.89 69.82 74.92 101.77 108.3 126.06 134.37 
8 11.84 13.56 26.94 30.38 45.46 48.19 70.58 76.55 101.59 105.69 126.21 136.05 
9 11.84 13.96 26.79 29.52 45.14 48 69.86 72.83 101.37 108.37 126.98 133.28 
10 11.84 12.32 26.79 29.7 45.46 48.72 69.84 76.78 101.53 106.71 125.97 134.12 
11 11.84 13.17 26.94 28.82 45.14 48.33 69.56 72.81 101.76 110.57 126.3 132.22 
12 11.84 12.41 26.85 28.58 45.16 49.15 69.66 74.95 101.74 110.24 126.46 131.43 
13 11.84 11.84 26.79 29.11 45.28 49.17 69.93 76.3 102.79 109.38 126.86 132.59 
14 11.84 13.66 26.94 29.78 45.22 47.95 69.86 73.7 101.13 108.32 127.56 133.58 
15 11.84 13.93 26.79 27.51 45.22 48.36 70.11 75.58 102.34 109.57 126.49 132.04 
16 11.84 14.52 26.94 30.26 45.41 48.38 70.02 75 102.01 109.63 125.66 134.89 
17 11.84 14.05 26.85 29.57 45.44 49.07 70 73.67 102.58 111.07 126.33 131.96 
18 11.84 12.32 26.85 30.54 45.41 48.21 69.69 75.39 101.2 109.09 126.89 133.8 
19 11.84 12.41 26.89 29.87 45.4 48.82 69.78 74.46 101.05 109.84 126.03 132.29 
20 11.84 12.9 26.83 28.54 45.22 48.8 69.78 73.94 102.23 107.37 125.88 136.35 
Av 11.84 13.16 26.86 29.37 45.30 48.60 69.97 74.84 101.92 108.71 126.42 133.53 
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Table A.3 
 14 Clients 16 Clients 18 Clients 20 Clients 22 Clients 24 Clients 
 Nash Sequential Nash Sequential Nash Sequential Nash Sequential Nash Sequential Nash Sequential 
1 135.21 141.3 157.99 167.25 175 187.09 196.57 206.89 227.21 239.3 254.96 265.48 
2 135.68 144.26 156.73 163.78 176.27 183.42 193.14 200.82 227.58 238.64 255.29 262.66 
3 134.47 142.55 155.5 158.91 174.76 185.74 198.45 209.32 229.35 236.14 251.92 258.16 
4 135.88 138.31 155.07 163.49 176.21 187.53 195.19 200.28 228.6 237.15 251.87 261.09 
5 135.86 145.96 156.05 163.95 177.21 187.22 195.25 204.17 227.64 232.54 250.83 258.52 
6 134.95 141.95 157.11 166.21 176.44 183.19 195.88 201.26 230.22 240.84 252.57 258.5 
7 135.28 140.24 157.61 165.95 178.4 180.79 197.34 203.47 225.27 241.06 252.76 258.88 
8 134.41 144.87 157.1 162.16 175.04 186.68 197.63 204.71 227.81 236.44 252.78 261.49 
9 135.83 141.88 156.2 161.05 175.86 184.46 195.8 202.02 227.79 237.67 255.01 256.56 
10 135.42 144.44 158.32 161.7 175.9 187.08 196.62 200.67 229.22 244.48 250.23 261.15 
11 135.58 142.87 156.7 157.88 175.33 182.97 194.93 201.58 227.61 237.37 250.1 259.99 
12 135.6 141.61 156.63 162.69 176.56 181.94 194.93 198.17 229.99 238.91 252.29 261.95 
13 135.6 140.73 157.16 166.6 176.58 183.6 195.94 206.9 227.28 238 251.3 257.29 
14 136.19 141.29 158.75 169.2 176.32 184.55 197.24 204.35 229.97 237.8 254.88 257.64 
15 135.6 140.96 157.04 162.97 177.56 184.79 196.05 203.45 227.49 236.15 253.54 260.45 
16 136.92 140.4 158.18 162.2 176.26 186.64 196.39 203.16 225.96 238.47 253.12 261.83 
17 134.96 143.95 157.8 162.26 176.41 184.63 196.27 202.37 225.9 234.64 249.84 260.23 
18 135.63 141.83 156.12 162.6 176.02 182.03 196.12 201.87 230.74 236.66 251.73 259.69 
19 136.01 142.47 156.99 163.26 176.55 186.15 196.71 201.96 228.16 234.63 251.07 260.46 
20 134.11 140.24 156.32 165.01 176.48 183.93 194.92 198.52 227.07 235.68 252.09 260.89 
Av 135.46 142.11 156.97 163.46 176.26 184.72 196.07 202.80 228.04 237.63 252.41 260.15 
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Table A.3 
 26 Clients 28 Clients 30 Clients 
 Nash Sequential Nash  Sequential Nash Sequential 
1 276.2 287.27 300.33 312.32 323.15 339.95 
2 272.47 279.81 295.18 305 325.4 334.55 
3 274.72 281.69 297.36 305.74 325.27 332.34 
4 273.59 281.83 296.12 305.36 328.56 333.63 
5 276.29 280.55 297.2 308.03 324.35 334.44 
6 276.93 282.1 297.32 305.64 323.58 335.88 
7 275.02 284.69 298.06 311.79 324.31 327.79 
8 274.18 281.56 298.5 307.39 322.04 334.98 
9 272.82 289.27 294.81 309.48 323.25 333.35 
10 275.21 282.89 295.7 305.54 327.82 335.08 
11 275.96 286.44 297.47 308.32 326.06 334.45 
12 272.3 281.72 297.48 303.48 323.83 335.51 
13 277.56 279.42 299.54 305.87 324.66 331.95 
14 273.88 286.17 298.28 304.37 321.96 336.62 
15 271.78 292.59 299.73 310.58 323.99 338.62 
16 275.16 280.5 294.91 303.84 326.33 337.25 
17 276.53 290.39 298.65 310.35 325.13 334.58 
18 271.68 286.51 298.43 306.25 322.3 330.65 
19 273.1 283.98 297.14 303.88 327.39 333.22 
20 272.13 282.12 299.14 298.55 322.21 337.41 
Av 274.38 284.08 297.57 306.59 324.58 334.61 
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The average for the two strategies 
Table A. 4: This table is average of averages variables for Nash and Sequential. 
Servers  
   Strategy 
Av (Av(Nash)) Av(Av(Sequential)) R=
𝜎𝑛
𝜎𝑠
× 100% 
2 190.052 196.32 96.81% 
4 171.15 179.38 95.41% 
6 161.6 168.28 96.02% 
 
 
The standard deviation for the two strategies 
Table A. 5: This table is standard deviation of averages variables for Nash and Sequential. 
Servers  
   Strategy 
StDev (Av(Nash)) StDev(Av(Sequential)) R=
𝜎𝑛
𝜎𝑠
× 100% 
2 126.89 131.5 96.49% 
4 107.8 111.8 96.42% 
6 99.94 102.39 97.61% 
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Figure A. 1: The environment for the simulation model. 
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Figure A. 2: The sequential load balancing for the first experiment. 
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Figure A. 3: The sequential load balancing for the second experiment. 
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Figure A. 4: The Nash Equilibrium load balancing for the first Experiment. 
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Figure A. 5: The sequential load balancing for the third experiment. 
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Figure A. 6: the Nash equilibrium load balancing for the second experiment. 
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Figure A. 7: The Nash equilibrium load balancing for the third experiment. 
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